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THE ROLE OF SADC INSTITUTIONS IN IMPLEMENTING SADC TREATY 
PROVISIONS DEALING WITH REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
A Saurombe* 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Treaty constitutes not only a 
statement of intent and resolve to overcome the burden of history but also an 
acknowledgement of the immense benefits of regional economic integration.1 The 
SADC Treaty, its various institutions and legal instruments constitute an important 
step in the direction of integration.2 The challenge now is how SADC Member States 
are willing to subject themselves to supranational governance as provided for by the 
Treaty and implemented by the key institutions that also derive their mandate from 
the Treaty. Among the many interventions that can be employed, the SADC needs 
the political consensus necessary among its Member States and the technical 
capacity required among those charged with the responsibility for such a task for 
both an unequivocal commitment to deep integration and the full acceptance of the 
inevitable, but short-lived, political costs of such an undertaking.3  
 
Sovereign states of the SADC will undoubtedly feel the effects integration will have 
on their sovereignty. However, it has to be pointed out here that the SADC came into 
being within the context of a freely concluded agreement; hence, the fear of 
supranational structures of the organisation jeopardising national sovereignty is not 
convincing.4 Supranational structures do not limit the sovereignty of Member States, 
because they are established as a result of negotiated power vested in a political 
entity that may not necessarily have the power to enforce its authority. The concept 
                                                 
  Amos Saurombe. LLB (Fort Hare), LLM (UWC, Amsterdam Law School). LLD (North West 
University (Potchefstroom)) Senior Lecturer, Mercantile Law Department, University of South 
Africa, sauroa@unisa.ac.za. 
1  Maruping "Challenges for Integration". The burden of history discussed here refers to past years 
of colonialism, underdevelopment and economic hardships that seem to have worsened even 
after the independence of the whole region. 
2  Evans, Holmes and Mandaza SADC 12.  
3  Saurombe Regionalisation 313-315. 
4  See generally Ferrari and Pollicino 2011 Comparative Law Review. 
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of supranational union is sometimes used to describe the European Union as a new 
type of political entity.5  
 
The undertaking to uphold supranational authority has to be anchored in the legal 
framework of the SADC Treaty and its Protocols. SADC institutions are thus 
empowered by these legal instruments to play a meaningful role in regional 
integration. Erasmus6 poses a number of relevant questions which governments 
involved in regional integration will have to address. These are: 'What are the 
implications of the treaty obligations for the parties' citizens?; How will their national 
policies be affected?; and What happens in the case of non-compliance?' This paper 
does not answer these questions exhaustively but provides an analysis of the legal 
provisions that form the basis of the functioning of key SADC institutions. In addition, 
Erasmus observes that:  
 
The more comprehensive the trade arrangements and the more advanced the 
integration process, the stronger the need for appropriate institutions with 
supranational powers.7 
 
Thus, the drive towards deeper integration in the SADC should equally be supported 
by stronger supranational mechanisms and the highest political level in a Member 
State. Regional economic integration in the SADC will be discussed with a thorough 
examination of the important institutional and legal structures of the organisation. 
This discussion will focus on the various institutions whose legal mandate is related 
to the economic integration process.  The institutions are authorised by the Treaty 
and the Protocol on Trade, among other things to harmonise the political and social 
economic policies of Member States, and to encourage popular participation in the 
activities of SADC and the implementation of SADC initiatives.8  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5      Kiljunen European Constitution in the Making 21-26.  
6  Erasmus 2011 SADC Law Journal 17. 
7      Erasmus 2011 SADC Law Journal 17. 
8      Saurombe Regionalisation 313-315. 
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2 Background 
 
The countries in Southern Africa have been key drivers of the new global 
proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs).9 Consequently, Southern Africa 
has taken its place on the global stage, mainly because of the existence of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC).10 Before the signing of the 
SADC Treaty, the organisation was run under a loose and non-binding structure of 
the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).11 The origins 
of the SADCC lie in the Frontline States,12 a group of Southern African countries that 
fought for independence from colonial rule. Their aim was to help liberate the whole 
region from colonial rule. In the 1960s and 70s, these newly independent states 
supported national liberation movements in the region by coordinating their political, 
diplomatic and military struggle to bring an end to colonial and white minority rule. 
The idea was to secure international cooperation for economic liberation and 
collective self-reliance.13 At that time, according to the late President of Botswana, 
Sir Seretse Khama, "economic dependence had in many ways made political 
independence somewhat meaningless".14 An additional effort under former President 
Kaunda of Zambia was to establish a transcontinental belt of independent and 
economically powerful nations from Dar es Salaam and Maputo on the Indian Ocean 
to Luanda on the Atlantic.15 
  
                                                 
9    Hereafter "RTAs". The members of the SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The membership of Madagascar was suspended after a coup 
d'état by opposition leader Andre Rajoelena. 
10    Hereafter the "SADC". For a historical background limited to up to 1985 see Abegunrin 1981-2 
 Current Bibliography on African Affairs 1-5. 
11   Oosthuizen Southern African Development Community 17. See also Abegunrin "Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference" 36. The Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference was established in 1980 by the governments of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, which was the forerunner of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), which was formed in Lusaka, Zambia, on 1 
April 1980, following the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration (1980) by the nine founding member 
states. See also the Harare Memorandum of Understanding (1981). There was no treaty signed 
for SADCC. 
12  Clough and Ravenhill "Regionalism in Southern Africa". See also Thompson Challenge to 
Imperialism. See also Nsekela Southern Africa 21 
13  Tsikata "Southern Africa: Trade, Liberalisation and Implications" 14. See also Gibb 1998 JMAS 
287-306. 
14  Khama 1979 Africa Research Bulletin 51-55. See also Gibb 1998 JMAS 287-306.  
15  Kaunda "Address" 3-4. 
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This de facto regional organisation needed a treaty and a number of other legally 
binding instruments.16 Thus, the SADC was formed as an international regional 
organisation established in terms of a treaty and declaration referred to as the 
'Treaty of Southern African Development Community', signed by the heads of state 
and government of the signatory Member States.17   
 
The SADC Treaty provides the legal framework of the organisation by setting out the 
status,18 principles and objectives,19 and obligations of Member States;20 the 
membership,21 the institutions,22 procedural matters relating to areas of cooperation 
among Member States,23 cooperation with other international organisations,24  
financial issues,25 dispute settlement,26 and lastly sanctions, withdrawal and 
dissolution.27 The SADC Treaty makes provision for the formulation of subsidiary 
legal instruments such as protocols giving specific mandates to various SADC 
institutions. A total of twenty three protocols have so far been formulated.28  
 
3 SADC institutions supporting regional integration  
 
In deciding on the SADC's institutional framework, the founders were particularly 
sensitive to the lessons and experiences of past attempts at regional cooperation in 
Africa, some of which had ended in failure and bitter disappointment; for example, 
the collapse of the East Africa Community in 1977.29 Such failure was largely 
because sensitive issues of how best to equitably share the cost and benefits of 
regional cooperation had not been sufficiently addressed and agreed upon at both 
                                                 
16  Olivier "Southern African Development Community" 15. 
17  The SADC Treaty was signed at Windhoek, Namibia on 17 August 1992, entering into force on 
30 September 1993. The Treaty was amended at Blantyre, Malawi in August 2001. A 
consolidated version of the Treaty and all its amendments can be accessed on the SADC official 
website (SADC Date Unknown www.sadc.int). 
18  Article 14 SADC Treaty (1992). 
19  Chapter 3, Aa 4 and 5 SADC Treaty (1992). 
20  Article 6 SADC Treaty (1992). 
21  Chapter 4 Aa 37 and 8 SADC Treaty (1992). 
22  Chapter 5 Aa 9 and 16A SADC Treaty (1992). 
23  Article 21 SADC Treaty (1992). 
24  Article 24 SADC Treaty (1992). 
25  Chapter 9 Aa 25-27 and Chapter 10 Aa 28-30 SADC Treaty (1992). 
26  Article 32 SADC Treaty (1992). 
27  Chapter 13 Aa 33-35 SADC Treaty (1992). 
28  See list of Protocols available on SADC Date Unknown www.sadc.int 
29  Mutua 2007 allafrica.com. 
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national and regional levels. To avoid similar pitfalls from the beginning, the SADC 
placed particular emphasis on a decentralised institutional arrangement. This was a 
deliberate avoidance of supranational institutions. This ensured that Member States 
are the principal actors in the formation and implementation of policy decisions. The 
SADC Treaty basically re-enacted the institutional structure of the SADCC.30 Thus 
not much was learnt from the 1980 failures. Deeper integration and trade 
liberalisation was not going to be realised under a decentralised institutional 
arrangement. Thus deeper integration and trade liberalisation is not possible under a 
decentralised institutional arrangement.31 Deeper integration requires governance 
that transcends individual Member States within the region to a level where decision 
making is delegated to regional institutions that are to some extent independent of 
Member States’ influence. If this is not done, regional institutions might lack 
democratic legitimacy and may result in the loss of popular support for the whole 
project. This is important because the nature and extent of the powers vested in 
regional institutions determines the institutions’ ability to promote the region’s 
integration agenda.32 Therefore the importance of the existence of supranational 
institutions in promoting regional integration cannot be overemphasised.33 According 
to Mutharika34 
 
Economic integration requires the delegation of power to a supranational body 
entrusted with the task of safeguarding the interest of both the supranational entity 
as well as that of the individual Member States. 
 
The principal organs driving regional economic integration in the SADC are the 
Summit, which is made up of Heads of State and Government; the Troika; the 
Council of Ministers; the Integrated Committee of Ministers; the Tribunal; SADC 
National Committees; Standing Committee of Officials; and the Secretariat. The 
SADC Tribunal was the only new institution provided for under the Windhoek Treaty. 
For the purposes of this paper only the important institutions relevant to regional 
integration will be discussed. Each institution will be discussed according to the 
                                                 
30  Jakobeit, Hartzenberg and Charalambides 2005 www.acp-eu-trade.org 12. 
31    See generally Mattli 1999. The Logic of Regional Integration 3. 
32  Afadameh-Adeyemi and Kalula 2010 Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa: 
Yearbook 30. 
33  Afadameh-Adeyemi and Kalula 2010 Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa: 
Yearbook 30. 
34  Mutharika Towards Multinational Economic Cooperation 31 
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provisions of the Treaty and the mandate of the Protocol on Trade. The role of each 
of these institutions in SADC regional integration is also analysed. 
 
3.1 The Summit35 and its role in regional integration 
 
The Summit is made up of Heads of State and/or Government from all SADC 
Member States. The decisions of the Summit are taken by consensus.36 It is the 
ultimate policy-making institution of SADC and is responsible for the overall policy 
direction and control of functions of the Community.37 The Summit is also a 
legislative organ.38 The Summit is described as an organ capable of making 
decisions that are 'binding'.39 The Summit usually meets once or twice a year around 
August or September in a Member State.40 It appoints the Executive Secretary and 
Deputy Secretary of the Secretariat41 and admits new members into SADC.42 The 
official Heads of States and Government Summit for 2008 was held in South Africa 
where the South African Chairmanship of the Summit presided over the launch of the 
SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) at the 28th SADC Summit on 18 July 2008.43 Speaking 
at the Summit, the then South African President Thabo Mbeki said SADC Member 
States needed to assess how best they could advance the integration effort and the 
region's trade performance, noting that the most serious constraints to growing the 
region were underdeveloped structures and supply capacity.44 The Windhoek 
Summit of 2010 resolved that SADC should not proceed to form a customs union.45 
This shows that the Summit plays a critical role in SADC regional integration. 
Moreover, Article 22(1) of the SADC Treaty places a duty on the Member States, 
                                                 
35  Article 10 SADC Treaty (1992). 
36  Article 10 SADC Treaty (1992). The use of consensus by the Summit has compromised its 
functions, for example the issues surrounding Zimbabwe's refusal to accept the decision of the 
Tribunal ruling in the Campbell case. This means that for the decision to be endorsed by the 
Summit, Zimbabwe will have to support it. This was highly unlikely and it became clear that the 
Summit sided with Zimbabwe and suspended the Tribunal. 
37  Ng’ong’ola 1999 Journal of World Trade 485-506. 
38  Article 10(3) SADC Treaty (1992) empowers the Summit to adopt legal texts and instruments for 
the implementation of the Treaty. Some of the work can be delegated to the Council of Ministers. 
39  Article 10(8) SADC Treaty (1992). 
40  Article 10(5) SADC Treaty (1992). 
41  Article 10(7) SADC Treaty (1992). 
42  Article 8(2) SADC Treaty (1992). 
43  SADC. 2008. Summit Communiqué 
44  SADC. 2008. Summit Communiqué 
45  SADC 2010 www.sadc.int. 
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who are represented at the highest level in the Summit, to adopt legal instruments 
for the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. This mandate was clearly 
exercised by the August 1996 Summit through the creation and implementation of 
the Protocol on Trade that led to the establishment of the FTA in 2008.46 
 
Special Summit meetings are also called to discuss issues of emergency and 
whenever there is a need. The Summit is a critical institution that has to approve 
policy before it is considered for adoption into law, for example protocol formulation. 
Even the judgements of the SADC Tribunal have to be referred to the Summit, since 
it is the only body that can sanction the findings of the Tribunal.47 Many 
commentators have placed the hope of SADC integration on the political willingness 
of regional leaders. In future, the SADC’s ambitious trade timetable needs to be 
matched by the political will to meet the deadlines in order to restore the 
organisation’s flagging credibility. This means that this body has to show political 
willingness to implement the SADC integration agenda. Unfortunately this is lacking, 
as regional leaders are reluctant to surrender state sovereignty for the benefit of the 
region. 
 
Regional integration is a priority for the Summit. The SADC Trade Protocol itself is 
evidence of this need. In 2006, the Summit agreed to convene an Extraordinary 
Summit to discuss regional integration matters.48 The Extraordinary Summit was 
held in South Africa and the SADC Heads of State and Government reviewed the 
state of integration of the region and resolved to accord this process high priority, 
bearing in mind the key milestones approved by the Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan (RISDP). The priority accorded to regional integration at the 
Summit suggested that political momentum seems to have developed in recent 
years. Subsequently, the Ordinary Summit held in Lusaka in August 2007 focused its 
attention on the imperatives to deepen regional economic integration and fast-track 
implementation of infrastructure development in the region. From there on the 
                                                 
46  See SADC. 2008. Summit Communiqué 
47  Article 16(4) SADC Treaty (1992): "The Tribunal shall also have advisory jurisdiction at the 
request of the Summit or the Council of Ministers". 
48  SADC 2006 www.dfa.gov.za. 
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Summit has been on target in trying to implement the RISDP, as evidenced by the 
implementation of the FTA in August 2008.49 More functions of the Summit are 
enumerated under Article 10 of the SADC Treaty. 
 
The above discussion has emphasised the importance of the Summit in SADC 
economic integration. As the supreme policy-making institution, it has to promote 
economic integration objectives if deeper integration is to be realised. The leadership 
of the Summit has not always been clear. As part of its structure the Summit is led by 
a chairman and vice-chairman elected 'for an agreed period' and 'on the basis of 
rotation'.50 However, the election procedures have not been specified, which has left 
the Heads of State and Government some latitude in the selection of the political 
leader of the organisation at any particular time. This leadership role is not 
necessarily taken on by the persons best qualified to guide the SADC agenda at any 
particular time; thus, regional integration efforts may be either weak or robust 
depending on the calibre of the current leader. This problem is not unique to the 
SADC, and it could be resolved by amending the SADC Treaty and giving more 
power to the Secretariat, which would be in charge of the daily running of the 
organisation. Another weakness in the role of the Summit in regional integration is 
that, since the Heads of State and Government cannot meet as often as there are 
binding decisions to be made, the efficiency of the organisation is seriously 
compromised. 
 
The SADC Treaty does not state if the binding decisions of the Summit have a direct 
effect in the territory of Member States. The silence on the part of the SADC Treaty 
creates a gap in the quest for regional integration in the SADC because the manner 
in which decisions of the Summit are implemented is left to the discretion of Member 
States. To complicate matters further, it is also notable from Articles 10(8), 11(3)(6) 
and 13(6) that the Summit and other subsidiary organs make decisions by 
consensus,51 and yet there are no provisions in the Treaty for breaking an impasse 
where a consensus cannot be reached. In order to reach consensus, decisions are 
clouded in vague formulations and wide discretions that undermine legal certainty 
                                                 
49  SADC 2008 www.sadc.int. 
50  Article 10(4) SADC Treaty (1992). 
51  Articles 10(8), 11(3)(6) and 13(6) SADC Treaty (1992). 
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and are, in fact, anathema to rules-based trade.52 This was clearly illustrated by the 
Summit's refusal to sanction the Tribunal judgement given against Zimbabwe in the 
Campbell case.53 To make matters worse, this case has led to the suspension of the 
Tribunal with its judges pronouncing that the actions of the July 2011 Summit clearly 
amounted to Tribunal dissolution, an ultra vires action on the part of the Summit.54 
The Summit does not have the power to suspend the judicial arm of the SADC or 
any part of the Treaty. Changes can be made only by an amendment of provisions in 
the applicable legal instruments. Thus, the SADC Summit’s decisions have given 
rise to serious concerns about the rule of law in the organisation.55 
 
It is now very doubtful that the Summit will in future make decisions that are not 
favourable to some Member States but favourable to the region. According to 
Erasmus the consensus nature of decision making by the Summit gives the member 
in violation of its obligations veto over any sanctions.56 This point can be illustrated 
this way; as the Summit reaches its decisions through consensus, a Member State 
may decide to protect its individual interests by voting against a policy. By so doing it 
will prevent the achievement of the required consensus. This is a major flaw in the 
system.57 Given this scenario, the critical decision-making processes affecting 
regional integration are subjected to uncertainties to some extent. There is a need to 
deal with these uncertainties. One way of dealing with these uncertainties is to 
amend the provisions of the Treaty in order to reflect who should be in charge of 
making sure that Member States implement their SADC Treaty obligation. It is clear 
from this discussion that the Summit is playing a pivotal role in SADC regional 
integration at the moment and in the foreseeable future. However, as an institution of 
the SADC the Summit has not garnered enough political will to draw the line 
between the individual interest of Member States and that of the region. These 
challenges will have to be addressed if this organ is to remain the backbone to 
regional integration in the region.  
 
                                                 
52  Erasmus 2011 SADC Law Journal 130. 
53    Saurombe Regionalisation 31-139. 
54    Saurombe Regionalisation 279. 
55  Erasmus Protection of Rights in SADC 3. 
56  Erasmus Protection of Rights in SADC 3. 
57  Erasmus Protection of Rights in SADC 3. 
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3.2 The Troika58 and its role in SADC regional integration 
 
The Extraordinary Summit decided to formalise the practice of a Troika system, 
consisting of the Chair, the incoming Chair and the outgoing Chair of the SADC, 
which has been effective since it was established by the Summit in Maputo, 
Mozambique in 1999.59 According to Article 9(1), the Troika also applies with respect 
not only to the Summit but also to the Organ, the Council, the integrated Committee 
of Ministers and the standing Committee of Officials.60 Other members may be co-
opted into the Troika as and when necessary.61 This system has enabled the 
organisation to execute tasks and implement decisions expeditiously, as well as to 
provide policy direction to SADC institutions in periods between regular SADC 
meetings, as it is easy to convene.62 This is a key institution responsible for decision 
making,63 facilitating the implementation of decisions64 and providing policy 
direction.65 The Troika has been very functional with regard to the issues pertaining 
to the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis,66 as well as the instabilities in the DRC 
and Madagascar. 
 
The Troika is an important institutional organ that has to keep the integration agenda 
on track during its frequent meetings. Strategically, it plays a critical role in meeting 
more often than the Summit and its decisions and work are closely linked to the 
Summit. The main weakness of the Troika is its subordination to the Summit, as its 
resolutions can be nullified by the Summit. For example, important resolutions on 
Zimbabwe made at the Troika Summit of the Organ on Politics and Defence held in 
Livingstone, Zambia, were not endorsed by the Summit, which met the following 
                                                 
58  Article 9A SADC Treaty (1992). 
59 SADC Date Unknown www.africa-union.org. 
60  This wide scope means that the Troika is a flexible mechanism. This flexibility is evident in A 9.7, 
which gives each institution the power to create committees on an ad hoc basis. A 9.8 leaves the 
Troika of each institution to determine its own rules of procedure. 
61  Erasmus Protection of Rights in SADC 3. 
62  Erasmus Protection of Rights in SADC 3. 
63  Article 9.6.1 SADC Treaty (1992).  
64  Article 9.6.2 SADC Treaty (1992).  
65  Article 9.6.3 SADC Treaty (1992).  
66 SADC 2011 www.sadc.int. 
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month.67 The Summit merely noted the resolution; a move that did not convey any 
legal significance. 
 
It is evident in the character of the Troika that the SADC intended to foster the 
continuity of SADC activities. The idea of putting together an organ consisting of the 
current, outgoing and incoming Chairs is an ideal strategy for promoting continuity 
and is critical for the regional integration process, which requires an organisation that 
embraces change. In its practical work, the Troika will be an ideal vehicle for the full 
implementation of the RISDP. Another advantage for the regional integration that 
can be derived from the Troika is its ability to involve as many stakeholders as 
possible for regional integration within the SADC Treaty. Regional integration is a 
process that is highly likely to succeed if there is buy-in from as many stakeholders 
as possible. 
 
3.3 The Council of Ministers and its role68in regional integration 
 
The function of the Council of Ministers should remain as provided for under Article 
11 of the Treaty. In general, the Council serves as the engine room of the SADC in 
that it develops and implements the common agenda of the SADC.69 This Council 
consists of Ministers from each Member State, usually from the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs and Economic Planning or Finance.70 The Council has an important 
responsibility to oversee the functioning and development of the SADC and ensure 
that policies are properly implemented. Under the new structure it is recommended 
that the Council should meet four times a year.71 Since the RISDP is still without 
legal basis, the Council has to facilitate its implementation and take stock of its 
progress in its frequent meetings. Consequently, the Council of Ministers is the direct 
link between the SADC and Member States, and these Ministers are mandated to 
express Member States’ policy positions on regional matters. At the same time they 
play a critical role of promoting SADC initiatives in their various countries. This is 
                                                 
67  SADC 2011 www.sadc.int. 
68  Article 11 SADC Treaty (1992). 
69  Afadameh-Adeyemi and Kalula 2010 Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa: 
Yearbook 5. 
70  Saurombe Regionalisation 279. 
71  Article 11(4) SADC Treaty (1992). 
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critical since regional integration that lacks popular support from the ordinary citizens 
of Member States is bound to fail. 
 
A very important role of this institution is its advisory role to the Summit on matters of 
overall policy, and the efficient and harmonious functioning and development of the 
SADC.72 Since the Summit normally meets once or twice a year, this advisory role is 
critical in keeping the most important organ of the SADC well informed of the 
developments around regional integration. Closely associated with this role is the 
Council's duty to perform such other duties as may be assigned to it by the Summit 
of the Treaty.73 The Council of Ministers also approves the policies, strategies and 
work programmes of the SADC. This role is important for regional integration; 
especially for programmes initiated by the RISDP. The role of convening 
conferences and other meetings for the purpose of promoting the objectives and 
programmes of the SADC is also important for regional integration.74 A number of 
these activities are necessary for the success of regional integration in the SADC, for 
example the awareness that is created through these conferences. The Council's 
role of considering and recommending to the Summit any application for 
membership75 directly influences the process of regional integration. The addition of 
new members to the SADC is also a mirror of the pace of regional integration in the 
SADC. The formation of the Tripartite FTA that includes members of the SADC, the 
EAC and the COMESA is testimony to the advantages associated with the increase 
in numbers to a regional economic community.76 
 
The main weakness of the Council of Ministers is that it has no power to make 
binding decisions; it must report all of its actions to the Summit. As an institution that 
oversees the implementation of SADC policies, it is vital that it should have the 
power to make binding decisions.77 
                                                 
72  Article 2(3) SADC Treaty (1992). 
73  Article 2(12) SADC Treaty (1992). 
74  Article 2(11) SADC Treaty (1992). 
75  Article 2(7) SADC Treaty (1992). 
76  Saurombe Regionalisation 1. 
77  Afadameh-Adeyemi and Kalula 2010 Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa: 
Yearbook 5. 
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3.4 The Integrated Committee of Ministers and its role in regional 
integration 
 
The Integrated Committee of Ministers is made up of at least two ministers from 
each Member State with a mandate to meet at least once a year. This is a new 
institution aimed at ensuring proper policy guidance, coordination and harmonisation 
of cross-sectoral activities. The Integrated Committee of Ministers oversees the 
activities of the four core areas of integration, notably Trade, Industry, Finance and 
Investment;78 Infrastructure and Services;79 Food, Agriculture and Natural 
Resources;80 and Social and Human Development and Special Programmes,81 
including the implementation of the Strategic Plan in their areas of competence. 
These are key area for SADC regional integration. For the purpose of emphasising 
the importance of this Committee, it is important to realise that the issues of trade 
and integration are first highlighted in the Committee. Thus, the Committee takes an 
initiating role in influencing policy on regional integration. The Committee comprises 
at least two Ministers from each Member State and should be responsible to Council. 
The representative nature of the Committee allows it to enjoy the support of all 
Member States.82 Member ownership of SADC programmes is the key to regional 
integration. 
 
The Integrated Committee of Ministers also provides policy guidance to the 
Secretariat and makes decisions on matters pertaining to the Directorates, as well as 
monitoring and evaluating their work. It also has decision-making powers to ensure 
the rapid implementation of the programmes that would otherwise wait for a formal 
meeting of the Council. This is a critical characteristic, given the fact that the RISDP 
is faced with critical deadlines that cannot accommodate the delay attendant upon 
the bureaucracy of the organisation. Critically, it is tasked with monitoring and 
controlling the implementation of the RISDP, once approved by Council.83  
 
                                                 
78  Article 12.2.1 SADC Treaty (1992). 
79  Article 12.2.2 SADC Treaty (1992). 
80  Article 12.1.3 SADC Treaty (1992). 
81  Article 12.1.4 SADC Treaty (1992). 
82  Article 12.1 SADC Treaty (1992). 
83  Article 12.2 SADC Treaty (1992). 
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The main challenge of this institution is that its decisions are made by consensus 
and are reported to the Council.84 The weakness of requiring consensus has already 
been emphasised during the discussion of the Summit. 
 
3.5 The Standing Committee of Officials85 and its role in regional integration 
 
The Standing Committee of Officials forms a technical advisory committee to the 
Council. It is made up of one permanent secretary from the ministry of the Member 
State which serves as the SADC national contact point. This makes this committee 
an important and strategic channel of information dissemination from the SADC to 
the Member States’ national contact points; a feature that promotes awareness for 
economic integration among Member States. They meet at least four times a year 
with their decisions being made by consensus.  Their frequent meetings can serve 
as an expediting tool for the SADC regional economic integration agenda, which has 
often been accused of a slow pace. Their main function is also to process 
documentation from the Integrated Committee of Ministers and report to the Council. 
 
3.6 The SADC Tribunal86 and its role in regional integration 
 
The SADC Tribunal is currently not operational after the decision to suspend it by the 
2010 Windhoek Summit.87 The 2011 Summit put in place a further moratorium 
barring the Tribunal from accepting any new cases, even those not related to the 
Campbell case. The Summit also paralysed the Tribunal by not renewing contracts 
for sitting Judges or replacing them. Thus the Tribunal would be unable to accept 
new cases since it did not comply with the requirements for its composition as 
prescribed by Article 3 of the SADC Tribunal Protocol.88 Notwithstanding the current 
status of this judicial forum, the rationale for this discussion is to emphasise the legal 
mandate given to the Tribunal by the SADC Treaty and the way in which that 
mandate relates to regional integration. The Tribunal of the SADC is provided for 
                                                 
84  Article 12 SADC Treaty (1992). 
85  Article 13 SADC Treaty (1992). 
86  Article 16 SADC Treaty (1992). 
87   SADC 2011 www.swradioafrica.com. See also Van der Bosch 2011 www.globalissues.org.  
88    Scholtz 2011 SADC Law Journal 197. 
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under Article 16 of the Declaration and Treaty Establishing the SADC of 1992. The 
Community’s members approved the Protocol required to set up the Tribunal in the 
year 2000. Finally, the Protocol entered into force with the signing of the Agreement 
Amending the Treaty of the SADC in August 2001. This amendment signalled 
renewed energy in the integration of the community, making the Protocol on the 
Tribunal an integral part of the Treaty and thus automatically applicable to all 
Member States. 
 
According to Article 16(1) of the SADC Treaty: 
 
The Tribunal shall be constituted to ensure adherence to the proper interpretation of 
the provisions of the SADC Treaty and subsidiary instruments, and to adjudicate 
such disputes as may be referred to it. 
 
The Tribunal is also authorised to determine, inter alia, any disputes regarding the 
interpretation and application of the Treaty and its Protocols that cannot be settled 
amicably.89 This provision is reiterated in Article 14 of the Protocol of the Tribunal.90 
If the interpretation of the SADC Treaty becomes an issue, the SADC Tribunal 
should be an independent forum to rule on the correct interpretation or application of 
the legal instruments at stake.91 Persistent failure to fulfil obligations under the Treaty 
can result in the imposition of sanctions on the defaulting member.92 However, such 
sanctions can be imposed only by the Summit.93 Accordingly, sanctions can be 
imposed on a Member State that persistently, without good reason, fails to fulfil its 
obligations assumed under the SADC Treaty.94 However, in view of the Summit's 
consensus-based character, resorting to such drastic measures is not contemplated, 
since the defaulting member would have to support the sanction resolutions.95  
 
                                                 
89  Article 3 SADC Treaty (1992). 
90  According to A 16.2 SADC Treaty (1992), the composition, powers, functions, procedures and 
other related matters governing the Tribunal shall be prescribed in a Protocol, which shall, 
notwithstanding the provisions of A 22 of the Treaty, form an integral part of the Treaty, adopted 
by the Summit. 
91  Erasmus 2011 SADC Law Journal 130. 
92  Article 33 SADC Treaty (1992). 
93  Article 33.2 SADC Treaty (1992). 
94  Article 33.1 SADC Treaty (1992). 
95    Article 10(8) SADC Tribunal Protocol (2008). 
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The Tribunal is critical for the integration process for the SADC, as it provides a legal 
guidance to all SADC institutions and, most importantly, can play an oversight role 
during the implementation stages of the integration agenda. Its decisions are final 
and binding.96 If the SADC is truly rules based, the rulings by the Tribunal will 
normally be binding on the parties involved.97  
 
However, the discussion of the SADC Tribunal points to its apparent weaknesses 
and, most importantly, the Summit’s failure to sanction its judgment on the Campbell 
case.98 On 28 November 2008, the SADC Tribunal ruled that 78 white Zimbabwean 
farmers could keep their farms because the Zimbabwean land reform programme 
had discriminated against them.99 The Zimbabwean Government rejected this ruling, 
challenging its legality and lobbied the Summit to suspend the Tribunal. The Tribunal 
was dully suspended in August 2010, pending an independent six-month review of 
its "role, functions and terms of reference".100 
 
The review process was required to address inter alia the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; 
the interface between Community law and national laws in the SADC; the mandate 
of the existing appeals chamber of the Tribunal; the recognition, enforcement and 
execution of the Tribunal's decisions; the lack of clarity in some provisions of the 
SADC Treaty and the Tribunal Protocol; the tendency by Member States to give 
primacy to domestic laws or jurisdiction over SADC law; and the reluctance of 
Member States to relinquish some aspects of their sovereignty to the SADC.101 
However, after the review was completed, the SADC justice ministers and attorney 
generals questioned anew its fundamental elements and then initiated a new, 
partisan review. This led the June 2011 Summit to suspend all work for the Tribunal, 
going so far as to stop it from hearing new cases unrelated to the Campbell case. 
The decision not to reappoint or replace the Tribunal's 10 judges rendered the 
                                                 
96  Article 16.5 SADC Treaty (1992). 
97  Erasmus 2011 SADC Law Journal 130. 
98  Mike Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe SADC (T) 2/2007 (28 November 2008). 
99  Ebobrah 2009 Afr Hum Rts L J 329. 
100  Scholtz 2011 SADC Law Journal 197. 
101  Scholtz 2011 SADC Law Journal 197. 
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Tribunal inoperative until at least August 2012. The remaining four judges102 of the 
SADC Tribunal described this move as amounting to the dissolution of the Tribunal 
altogether. This is contrary to the findings of the review process, which had even 
found that the Tribunal’s ruling was legitimate and suggested a need for the further 
strengthening of the Tribunal.  
 
The Tribunal had acted within its mandate when it took the decision in accordance 
with Article 32(5) of the Protocol on the Tribunal to make a report of non-compliance 
to the Summit of the SADC. However, this procedure shows the handicap of 
international judicial institutions in terms of their inability to enforce their own 
decisions. The SADC Tribunal does not have its own judgement enforcement 
mechanism; it relies on Member States to enforce its decisions.103 Article 32(1) of the 
Protocol on the Tribunal requires the decisions of the Tribunal to be registered and 
enforced by Member States as foreign judgements.104 This creates a gap in the 
enforcement of the Tribunal's decisions because it subjects the enforcement of the 
Tribunal decisions to domestic laws that govern the enforcement of foreign 
judgements in Member States.105  This provision is an example of a matter on which 
the SADC instruments are unclear and deserve urgent attention and clarification.106 
 
The weakness of the above mechanism played itself out when in the case of 
Gramara (Pty) Ltd and one other v The Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe 
and two others (HC 33/09) [2010] ZWHHC1 the Zimbabwe High Court refused to 
register and enforce a judgement of the Tribunal on the grounds that the decision of 
the Tribunal was contrary to public policy in the Republic of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's 
action is contrary to the spirit of regional integration and sends out a wrong message 
that Member States can undermine regional jurisprudence or fail to honour their 
                                                 
102 These judges include the Tribunal President, Mauritius Chief Justice Ariranga Pillay and Justices 
Rigoberto Kambovo, Onkemetse Tshosa and Frederick Chomba. 
103  Scholtz 2011 SADC Law Journal 197. 
104  Afadameh-Adeyemi and Kalula 2010 Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa: 
Yearbook 5. 
105  Afadameh-Adeyemi and Kalula 2010 Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa: 
Yearbook 5. 
106  Scholtz 2011 SADC Law Journal 197. 
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obligations under the relevant regional instruments.107Accordingly, if regional 
integration is to be firmly rooted within the SADC, the SADC Tribunal must be 
allowed to develop the jurisprudence of SADC law, as was the case with the 
European Court of Justice in the formative years of the European Union.108 
 
This discussion demonstrates that political organs of international institutions are 
vital for the creation of a culture of compliance.109 The actions of the Summit are 
actually illegal since, without amending the SADC Treaty and Protocol on the 
Tribunal, the Summit has no power to restrict the Tribunal's jurisdiction or to overrule 
the protocol. The suspension of the Tribunal as a result of a Member State's 
dissatisfaction with the decisions of the Tribunal casts doubt on the acceptability of 
decisions of supranational institutions by SADC Member States. 
 
On the assumption that the Tribunal will be reinstated, its influence and credibility 
have already been eroded. If it is envisaged that the Tribunal will then be called upon 
in the near future to decide on issues relating to regional integration, and if the 
Zimbabwean experience is used as a precedent, Member States may get away 
without being sanctioned after a breach of their obligations under the SADC Treaty. 
This is a dangerous precedent for an institution that is entrusted with developing the 
jurisprudence of the region.110 The Summit can, at will, decide to make decisions that 
directly impact on the path of regional integration in SADC. There are already 
several integration breaches that are happening in the region, especially to the 
citizens of the region. An example is the charging of high tariffs on imports. This 
state of affairs was supposed to end by the time of the establishment of the FTA in 
2008. The FTA covers 85 per cent of all goods except motor vehicles and parts, as 
well as clothing material. However, high tariffs on substantially all trade in goods are 
still being reported in the region. The Tribunal is the most relevant forum to address 
                                                 
107  Afadameh-Adeyemi and Kalula 2010 Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa: 
Yearbook 5. 
108  Arnull European Union 76 
109  In terms of the organisational structure of SADC, the Summit is made up of Heads of State and 
Government and is the highest authority of the SADC. 
110  Afadameh-Adeyemi and Kalula 2010 Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa: 
Yearbook 5. 
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these issues because the court has jurisdiction to hear matters affecting private 
citizens.111  
 
The Tribunal is empowered by the Treaty to apply SADC law without fear or favour 
and to pave the way for the harmonisation of business law to the extent that these 
laws can also be applied by the Tribunal.112 The harmonisation of policies or the 
adoption of similar policies is a signal that a regional arrangement is seeking to 
achieve a high degree of economic integration.113 The drastic action taken to 
dissolve the Tribunal has sent the worst possible signal to the SADC region and to 
potential investors and the whole international community, reflecting the SADC's 
poor record on human rights, democracy and the rule of law.114 
 
3.7 The Secretariat115and Executive Secretary’s role in regional integration 
 
The SADC Secretariat is the principal executive institution of the SADC responsible 
for the strategic planning, coordination and management of SADC programmes.116 It 
is headed by an Executive Secretary and has its headquarters in Gaborone, 
Botswana.117 The Extraordinary Summit agreed that the Secretariat should be 
strengthened in terms both of its mandate and of the provision of adequate 
resources for it to be able to perform its functions effectively as provided for under 
Article 14 of the SADC Treaty and in accord with the Abuja Treaty. Currently the 
Secretariat is involved in a robust exercise of recruiting additional staff that will help 
speed up the process of integration. The SADC Secretariat’s main functions are to 
spearhead the strategic planning and management of the SADC programme.118 It is 
also tasked with implementing the decisions of the Summit and Council. This is a key 
responsibility with specific reference to the SADC’s regional integration agenda, and 
the implementation of the FTA, customs union and common market falls within the 
                                                 
111  See Mondlane v SADC Secretariat SADC (T) 7/2009 (5 February 2010); Kanyama v SADC 
Secretariat SADC (T) 5/2009 (29 January 2010). 
112  Saurombe Saurombe 2011 "The Southern African Development Community" 1-33. 
113  Goode Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms 359. 
114  Erasmus 2011 SADC Law Journal 17-34. 
115  Article 14 SADC Treaty (1992). 
116  Article 14.1.1 SADC Treaty (1992). 
117  Article 2.2 SADC Treaty (1992). 
118  Article 14.1.2 SADC Treaty (1992). 
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mandate of the Secretariat. The SADC Secretariat will be called upon to vigorously 
pursue SADC-related objectives in the negotiations and implementation of the 
SADC, EAC and COMESA Tripartite FTA. 
 
The task of organising and managing the SADC meetings also rests on the 
shoulders of the Secretariat;119 hence the timeframe of the full implementation of the 
RISDP has to be done properly. The responsibility for financial and general 
administration120 is critical for the SADC integration agenda and funding for the 
implementation of the RISDP has to be properly managed. Since SADC depends 
mostly on donor funding, proper management and administration of such is critical if 
the SADC wishes to secure future funding. The SADC Secretariat is called upon to 
mobilise financial support from both the private and public sector stakeholders for the 
purpose of funding regional integration programmes like transport corridors.121 
 
The representation and promotion of the SADC is also a key responsibility of the 
Secretariat,122 as the SADC requires key representation at regional and multilateral 
levels. The SADC is highly regarded in Africa as one of the most promising RECs. 
This reputation is based on to SADC's image and vision when compared with those 
of the other RECs operating in Africa. In addition, the SADC has already been 
identified by the African Union as one of the key pillars for the Africa Economic 
Community (AEC). The Secretariat also represents the SADC outside the African 
continent. On 29 March 2010 the SADC Executive Secretary, Dr Tomaz Augusto 
Salomão, signed a cooperation framework agreement with the Government of the 
Federative Republic of Brazil on behalf of the SADC in Brasilia, Brazil. The objective 
of the Agreement between the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and 
the SADC is to promote the economic, industrial, scientific and technological 
development of the people of Brazil and the SADC region. The priority areas for 
cooperation include, inter alia, infrastructure development with a special emphasis 
on energy, food security, information and communication technology, and science 
                                                 
119  Article 14.1.3 SADC Treaty (1992). 
120  Article 14.1.4 SADC Treaty (1992). 
121  Article 14.1.11 SADC Treaty (1992). 
122  Article 14.1.7 SADC Treaty (1992). 
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and technology. These are critical areas for the full implementation of the RISDP, in 
line with the drive for the development of capacity.123 
 
The infrastructure problem has been identified as one of the challenges for regional 
integration in the SADC. The cooperation and partnership between the Government 
of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the SADC is intended to take the following 
forms: the formulation and implementation of programmes and projects in areas of 
common interest, the exchange of information, the undertaking of internships and 
technical missions, the organisation of seminars, meetings and trainee programmes, 
as well as the development of research studies on areas of common interest. All of 
these aspects touch on technology transfer, a critical area for development in 
Southern Africa. On the same day the SADC also signed an Agreement with the 
Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (the CPLP) on the Provision of 
Financial Support for the Translation of the Content of the SADC Website into 
Portuguese. In terms of the Agreement, the CPLP will provide the financial support 
for the translation of the content of the SADC website into Portuguese.124 Such a 
translation will be useful for the SADC since Mozambique and Angola are 
Portuguese-speaking countries, whose optimal participation in SADC programmes 
has always been hampered by the language barrier. Deeper integration will be 
enhanced through this effort. 
 
The Secretariat plays a critical role in the promotion and harmonisation of the 
policies and strategies of Member States.125 The task of exercising this mandate is 
important at this critical phase of the FTA and customs union, as these stages 
require that Member States find a common ground on the elimination of all trade 
barriers for the FTA, as well as a compromise on a common external tariff (CET) 
acceptable to all Member States. The common external tariff will be a challenge, 
since the lowest level in existence in the proposed CU has to be adopted. Mauritius 
tariffs have already reached zero, hence the CET cannot go beyond that. With most 
SADC members still relying on tariffs as sources of revenue, a common ground will 
be difficult to find and an agreement can be achieved only once individual states’ 
                                                 
123  Article 14.1.11 SADC Treaty (1992). 
124  SADC 2010 www.sadc.int. 
125  Article 14.1.8 SADC Treaty (1992). 
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policies are harmonised. Common strategies to achieve common objectives are the 
starting point that the Secretariat is tasked to promote. The Secretariat has also 
been given a mandate to drive appropriate strategies for self-financing and income-
generating activities and investments, as well as undertaking research on community 
building and the integration process. 
 
The biggest challenge for the Secretariat is still the apparent reluctance on the part 
of Member States to surrender national initiative and active representativeness to the 
principle of supra-nationalism.126 The Secretariat is also poorly funded and relies 
mostly on donor funds. Comparisons can be drawn with like bodies in other regions, 
like Association of South-Eastern Asian Nations (ASEAN).127 Hafeez128 observes 
that: 
 
[t]he ASEAN Secretariat is understaffed and underfunded, has no open recruitment, 
staff seconded by member states.  
 
The governments of SADC Member States still fill most positions within the 
Secretariat by way of secondment. When jobs are advertised, interested candidates 
have to apply through each Member State’s national contact point129 and 
applications made directly to the Secretariat are not considered. 
 
4 An analysis of the role of SADC institutions in regional integration 
 
It is apparent therefore that the transformation from the SADCC to the SADC has not 
completely brought about the creation of supranational institutions. The current 
SADC institutional structure is not supranational because it is not independent of 
individual Member States. According to Tallberg:130 
 
Supranational institutions are largely independent of individual Member States and 
they are vested with decision-making powers which bind Member States. 
 
                                                 
126  Evans, Holmes and Mandaza SADC. 
127  ASEAN Date Unknown www.asean.org. 
128  Hafez Dimensions of Regional Trade Integration.61. 
129  Article 16A SADC Treaty (1992). 
130  Tallberg 2002 West European Politics 23-46. 
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This is not the case with the SADC. Evidence from the dissolution of the SADC 
Tribunal clearly shows that SADC institutions are not independent of the influence of 
Member States. Furthermore, key institutions within the organisation should work in 
harmony and exercise their powers in a manner that reflects the common agenda of 
the regional body. The SADC Summit is clearly playing a bullying role on the 
institutions which report to it. The current SADC setup creates institutions which only 
resemble supranational institutions. The pertinent outcome of this analysis is that the 
SADC institutional framework is not independent of the influence of Member States. 
The requirement of consensus in decision making for all institutions also weakens 
the organisation. These institutions therefore cannot be fully relied upon to propel the 
SADC towards deeper regional integration. 
 
5 Recommendations on how the law can address the problems of poor 
treaty implementation 
 
Firstly, the discussion of the different treaty provisions giving the SADC’s institutions 
a mandate to pursue regional integration indicates that the organisation is rules 
based, and a deliberate effort should therefore be made to ensure respect of its 
rules.131 The Tribunal has confirmed certain aspects of this rules-based system.132 
The shortcomings of the SADC Treaty are mostly evident from the excessive powers 
given to and employed by the Summit. It is recommended that the Summit’s powers 
be limited. It must not be possible for the Summit to undermine the efforts of the 
other institutions. This paper has identified the Tribunal as the most appropriate 
institution to be mandated to keep the Summit in check, instead of which the Summit 
has actually rendered the Tribunal inoperative. It is recommended that the Tribunal 
be reinstated in order to resume its role as the custodian of the rule of law in the 
SADC. 
 
The issue pertaining to the monitoring of the implementation of SADC Treaty 
provisions would also be enhanced by the reinstatement of the Tribunal, since the 
Tribunal was "constituted to ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of the 
                                                 
131  Erasmus 2011 SADC Law Journal 130. 
132  Erasmus 2011 SADC Law Journal 130; see also Mike Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe SADC 
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provisions of the SADC Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate upon 
such disputes as may be referred to it". Its decisions are final and binding.133 Thus 
the SADC Tribunal is ideally placed to monitor the powers of other institutions such 
as the Summit. The Tribunal should play the equally important role of making sure 
that SADC institutions implement the SADC Treaty provisions that they are charged 
with. 
 
SADC law can address the problems of poor implementation and the insufficient 
monitoring of compliance by imposing sanctions on members who "persistently fail, 
without good reason, to fulfil obligations assumed under this Treaty" or when they 
"implement policies which undermine the principles and objectives of SADC".134 
Applying these legal provisions could have easily resulted in the imposition of 
sanctions on Zimbabwe for having failed to comply with the SADC Tribunal's rulings 
on its human rights violations. It is part of the operational challenge in the SADC that 
compliance with international obligations is not being properly monitored, and there 
are no effective ways of enforcing sanctions for non-compliance.  
 
It is also recommended that the registration of Tribunal judgements in Member 
States be performed in order to be able to give domestic effect to the rulings of the 
Tribunal. There is a need to create more awareness in SADC Member States 
parliaments of the need to adopt international agreements. For example, the South 
African Constitution makes specific provision for the responsibility of the national 
executive in signing international agreement.135 This is in line with the 'general 
undertakings' listed in Article 6 of the SADC Treaty, that provides that Member 
States "shall take all steps necessary to ensure the uniform application of this 
Treaty" as well as "all necessary steps to accord this Treaty the force of international 
law". This means that Article 6(5) prescribes that the Treaty needs to be given effect 
within the Member States. It is recommended that Member States comply with this 
requirement, and in cases where the relevant national legislation is not available, 
new legislation may be required. Member States need to respect these provisions. 
 
                                                 
133  Article 16(5) SADC Treaty (1992). 
134  Article 33(1) SADC Treaty (1992). 
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6 Conclusion 
 
The SADC Treaty and Protocol on Trade provides a solid legal and institutional 
platform for its Member States to integrate their economies. Each and every SADC 
institution discussed in this paper has a unique role to play in this regional integration 
process. The debate on the success of the SADC regional economic integration 
agenda has not been the focus of this study; hence, it will not be concluded here. 
However, it is very important to realise that, in the current SADC legal and 
institutional framework, though it is not adequate, the effort of putting the SADC on 
the road to regional integration has not gone unrewarded. With the kind of legal 
mandate given by the SADC Treaty to the various institutions discussed in this 
paper, it can be concluded that the SADC Treaty is very ambitious on paper, but the 
institutions have a poor record with regard to implementation. Erasmus also 
concludes that "the question marks are not about the formal legal dimension: it is 
mostly about poor implementation and insufficient monitoring of compliance".136  
 
This paper has demonstrated that SADC institutions are not capable of completely 
fulfilling their legal obligations, although in some instances the lack of fulfilment was 
clearly a result of the legal instruments themselves being incomplete and needing 
further reform. The Summit’s failure to respect the judgments of the Tribunal is a 
clear example. The de facto suspension of the Tribunal subsequent to Zimbabwe's 
non-compliance with its orders creates the impression that SADC members are not 
committed to regional integration under the auspices of the SADC.137 It can also be 
concluded that SADC Member States neglect their legal obligations to fulfil the 
obligations of the Treaty. The full implementation of the 2008 FTA and the 
enforcement of the judgments of the Tribunal would contradict this statement, if they 
were to take place. Thus, under the current legal and institutional framework, the 
SADC’s regional integration agenda faces major challenges of implementation. The 
SADC’s legal arrangements should be seen as constituting binding and enforceable 
law which must be implemented before national and regional courts. 
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